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Changes in partnership patterns across the life course: 





Studies on Europe and the US indicate that marriage has been postponed, cohabitation 
has increased, and unions are more likely to dissolve. However, cross-national studies 
documenting these trends have typically studied each transition separately. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This study aims to simultaneously capture these different partnership trends while 
examining heterogeneity within countries. Using latent class growth curves, we ask 1) 
what is changing more – the increase in premarital cohabitation or the increase in 
divorce and union dissolution? and 2) is cohabitation emerging as a relationship 
indistinguishable from marriage? These analyses also allow us to see whether changes 




We use latent class growth models to trace the complexity of union formation in the 
United States and 14 countries in Europe by examining how union status can change 
between the ages of 15–45 for women born 1945–74. After determining the optimal 
number of latent classes, we calculate the probability of falling into each class by 




In all countries, changes in partnership patterns have been driven by the postponement 
of marriage. Premarital cohabitation has changed patterns of partnership behavior more 
than union dissolution. Cohabitation has emerged as its own class, but is not identical to 
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any marriage class. The US does not have disproportionately higher “relationship 





Throughout the industrialized world, relationship patterns have been transforming. 
Rather than entering and remaining within marriage, individuals now often enter into 
cohabiting relationships that may persist, convert to marriage, or end in dissolution 
(Perelli-Harris et al. 2012; Heuveline and Timberlake 2004). Individuals may 
experience a single union that lasts a lifetime or have multiple unions that change over 
the life course. Thus, the timing, duration, and repetition of cohabiting and marital 
unions have become very complex. This variety of relationship trajectories poses a 
challenge for understanding new family forms and comparing them across countries.  
Most of what we know about union formation cross-nationally focuses on one 
event at a time; for example, marriage or divorce. Researchers tend to rely on averaged 
behaviors and measures of central tendency, such as the median or variation in age at 
marriage and union formation (e.g., Billari and Liefbroer 2010; Manning, Brown, and 
Payne 2014) or the rate of cohabitation and divorce (e.g., Kalmijn 2007; Kennedy and 
Ruggles 2014). Some studies use percentages, life-table techniques, or event history 
analysis to describe the likelihood of experiencing single events (e.g., Andersson and 
Philipov 2002; Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2012) or a 
comparison of two events, such as marriage and cohabitation (e.g., Hoem et al. 2009). 
While these studies provide a valuable perspective on entrance into adulthood, they do 
not allow for a comparison of changes in union formation across the life course as 
adults mature during prime family formation ages, nor do they describe holistic 
relationship patterns within and across countries.  
In this paper we use Latent Class Growth Curve Models (LCGM) to examine 
partnership formation along multiple dimensions in 14 countries in Europe and the 
United States. LCGM traces relationship histories for each individual and then clusters 
the histories into latent classes. We then compare the distribution of the latent classes 
across countries. This approach provides a more comprehensive picture of the 
complexity of relationship patterns than basic measures of entry and exit from unions 
alone. The models show how individuals can transition into and out of different 
relationship states (i.e., never married, cohabiting, married having previously cohabited, 
directly married, and single after union separation) from ages 15–45. Our data also 
allows us to compare the changing distribution of partnership patterns for the 1945–54, 
1955–64, and 1965–74 cohorts. We expect that the heterogeneity of partnership patterns 
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will increase over time, as individuals no longer follow a standard life course. The 
LCGM also provide insights into several dimensions of partnership formation. 
First, the LCGM provide better information on how marriage has changed and the 
role of cohabitation across the life course. Investigating how people enter and possibly 
exit marriage reveals to what extent marriage is still a life-long union, preceded by 
cohabitation and/or ending in divorce. We can see whether the increase in premarital 
cohabitation or the increase in divorce has had a greater impact on partnership patterns, 
which could have broader implications for individuals and society. People can start 
their relationship with premarital cohabitation and then formalize their relationship 
through marriage with few negative consequences for themselves or others. Ending 
marriage with divorce, on the other hand, is more likely to have greater social, 
psychological, and financial implications, including a negative impact on well-being, 
physical and mental health, and child outcomes (Amato 2010). Thus, the change in 
marriage could primarily be due to increased premarital cohabitation, which has few 
social implications, or it could be due to increased instability, which could potentially 
have larger ramifications. In addition, analyzing cohabitation trajectories provides 
greater information on the function of cohabitation and to what extent it is becoming an 
alternative to marriage. 
Second, the growth curves represent the ages at which different transitions occur 
between 15 and 45, the prime childbearing ages for women. This age range goes 
beyond that of most sequence analysis studies, which focus on events that mark the 
entrance into adulthood (Elizinga and Liefbroer 2007; Lesnard et al. 2010). The curves 
show the probability of women being in each partnership state across ages for each 
class, simultaneously providing information on type of union status and when women 
are most likely to be in a given state. Thus, examining the age at partnership formation 
shows how marriage has been postponed, when women are most likely to cohabit, and 
the level of union dissolution throughout the age range. Third, we incorporate union 
dissolution and re-partnering into the models by tracing a curve for separation (i.e., 
returning to the state of being single after separation) and allowing individuals to re-
enter the marital or cohabiting state. Such an approach investigates union formation 
beyond first partnerships and allows us to think more comprehensively about the inter-
relationship between cohabitation, marriage, and re-partnering. 
Because our data cover a substantial proportion of Europe’s population, including 
North-South family patterns (Reher 1998) and East-West household regimes (Coale 
1992), the data is representative of a large variety of European relationship patterns. 
Our analysis also allows us to see to what extent the United States is an outlier in 
partnership behavior, especially in terms of relationship “churning” (Cherlin 2009). 
Previous studies usually compare the US to Western Europe; however, here we 
investigate whether some countries in Eastern Europe may provide a better comparison. 
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Several Eastern European countries have had very high divorce rates; for example, 
divorce rates in Russia have been among the highest in the world since the 1970s 
(United Nations 2012), and re-partnering in Russia is currently on the rise (Zakharov 
2015). Therefore the US may have more in common with countries such as Russia than 
Western Europe. Taken as a whole, these comparisons will provide insight into how 




2. Analytical framework 
In this paper we take a holistic approach that simultaneously models the timing, 
sequencing, and quantum of events (Billari 2005). We address the following research 
questions: how are partnership patterns distinguished by the changes in marriage and 
cohabitation, the age at which unions are formed, and the dissolution of relationships 
and re-partnering? How prevalent are different patterns of union formation across 
countries and cohorts? Below we discuss each of these dimensions in turn, as well as 
differences in family patterns across Europe and the United States. 
 
 
2.1 Changes in marriage and cohabitation 
Over the past few decades the institution of marriage has changed dramatically in most 
countries of Europe and the United States (Cherlin 2009; Perelli-Harris and Sánchez 
Gassen 2012). Marriage is no longer a life-long commitment that automatically starts 
with two people marrying before living together. Instead, marriages can start with 
cohabitation and end in divorce. Examining the different ways of starting and ending 
marriage provides insight into the institution of marriage and its meaning today. 
Marriages that start with cohabitation may not have a firm commitment from the outset: 
instead couples may “slide” into their relationships (Manning and Smock 2005). 
Marriages that start with cohabitation may also be qualitatively different from those in 
which couples marry directly; for example, more prone to divorce (Teachman 2003; 
Berrington and Diamond 1999), although this association may be due to selection 
factors (Lillard, Brien, and Waite 1995) and appears to be changing (Liefbroer and 
Dourleijn 2006; Reinhold 2010). In any case, the possibility of marriage ending in 
divorce has changed expectations and rules of behavior. Because couples are no longer 
guided by set norms that require commitment, marriage has become a less stable 
arrangement in which individuals can no longer rely on a mutual understanding of how 
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to act (Cherlin 2004). As a whole, new ways of starting and ending marriage indicate 
that marriage is becoming deinstitutionalized and less predictable. 
Changes in marriage have also been accompanied by a rise in cohabitation across 
Europe and the United States (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2012; Kennedy and 
Bumpass 2008; Heuveline and Timberlake 2004). It is difficult to know what the 
increase in cohabitation indicates: is cohabitation confined to a short-term trial period 
that converts to marriage, is it a long-term, stable relationship that is a substitute for 
marriage, or is it a short-lived relationship that indicates high levels of relationship 
turnover? Researchers have sought to understand and classify cohabitation using a 
variety of comparison groups and criteria (Smock 2000; Prinz 1995; Villeneuve-Gokalp 
1991; Kiernan 2004). For example, Heuveline and Timberlake (2004) used indicators 
such as incidence of cohabitation, median duration of cohabitation, and proportion 
ending in marriage to sort countries into six ideal types of cohabitation (marginal, 
prelude to marriage, stage in marriage process, alternative to single, alternative to 
marriage, and indistinguishable from marriage). Classifying countries based on average 
behavior, however, does not take into account the multiple types of behaviour that exist 
simultaneously within a country. For example, in Norway, where cohabitation is said to 
be “indistinguishable from marriage”, we may find several types of cohabitation: a 
proportion of women may cohabit into their 30s and 40s, and a similarly large 
proportion may premaritally cohabit and/or dissolve their unions. Therefore, the 
heterogeneity of patterns of union formation can indicate that cohabitation has multiple 




The timing of union formation – whether marriage or cohabitation – can also signify 
different types of relationship. Couples who form unions early may have relationship 
types distinct from those who form unions late. Previous studies show that union 
formation differs dramatically across cohorts, periods, and countries (Billari 2005; 
Hoem et al. 2009; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008). Throughout Europe and the US, 
marriage and union formation have increasingly been postponed (Sobotka and 
Toulemon 2008; Hoem et al. 2009; Billari and Liefbroer 2010; Manning, Brown, and 
Payne 2014), although the median age at first cohabitation has not increased in the 
United States (Manning, Brown, and Payne 2014). Nevertheless, Billari and Liefbroer 
(2010) show that although most countries have undergone shifts to average later ages at 
marriage, countries have also experienced an increase in the variance in median age at 
first marriage. The authors conclude that across Europe the transition from adulthood 
has shifted from “early, contracted, and simple” to “late, protracted, and complex.” 
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Therefore, by examining the variation in the age pattern of union formation, we can 
better understand the role of postponement in changes in union formation. We can see 
which countries have uniformly delayed marriage and union formation, which have 
witnessed greater variation in marriage timing, and which have experienced shifts in 
marriage timing due to premarital cohabitation. 
 
 
2.3 Separation and re-partnering 
Relationship patterns have also become more complicated due to the increasing 
instability that results from separation and divorce. A range of cross-national studies on 
union dissolution have shown how divorce has increased in most European countries 
and the US, but nonetheless not at the same rate in all countries (e.g., Heuveline and 
Timberlake 2004; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Kalmijn 2007; Andersson and Philipov 
2002; Kennedy and Ruggles 2014). These studies provide important information on the 
level and determinants of divorce, but they tend to focus on the outcome of unions, 
usually first unions, without presenting the whole picture of entrance into union 
formation. Other studies have shown how re-partnering has been increasing, with 
second and higher-order unions more likely to be cohabiting than marital (Sweeney 
2010; Skew, Evans, and Gray 2009; Galezewska, Perelli-Harris, and Berrington 2013). 
In some countries the level of re-partnering can be substantial (Galezewska, Perelli-
Harris, and Berrington 2013), possibly affecting fertility (Thomson et al. 2012) or other 
outcomes (Sweeney 2010). Thus, it is important to incorporate union dissolution and re-
partnering, not just entrance into first unions. 
 
 
2.4 Differences across Europe and with the United States 
Despite changes in partnership in nearly all countries, the timing, sequencing, and type 
of union formed has not converged across Europe (Billari and Liefbroer 2010). Instead, 
regional patterns have remained entrenched, indicating the persistent effect of social 
norms, economic conditions, policy context, and culture on family formation behavior. 
Several arguments explain the reasons for differences across Europe. First, differences 
in family formation appear to reflect historical cultural systems. Culture may be evident 
in the degree of “family ties”, with Northern European countries exhibiting “weak 
family ties” that correspond to early home-leaving and high levels of cohabitation, and 
Southern European countries maintaining “strong family ties” that encourage marriage 
(Reher 1998). Note, however, that even though Southern European countries appear to 
have preserved traditional marriage norms, both the age at marriage and those who have 
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ever cohabited have increased, although childbearing within cohabitation has hardly 
increased at all (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Perelli-Harris et al. 2012).  
Eastern and Western Europe also appear to have different cultural patterns of 
family formation, with Eastern Europe historically characterized by early, universal 
marriage, and Western Europe characterized by later marriage and a substantial 
proportion never marrying (Coale 1992). Some parts of Eastern Europe appeared to 
diverge further in the 1970s, when divorce rates increased substantially. For example, 
Russia has had the highest divorce rates in the world, potentially due the young age at 
marriage and marriage prompted by pregnancy, both associated with higher risk of 
divorce (Jasilioniene 2007). With the collapse of socialism, which was accompanied by 
economic and social turmoil, many Eastern European countries began to experience a 
decline in marriage rates, indicative of increasing cohabitation, postponement, and even 
non-marriage, although the countries also became increasingly different from each 
other (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). These new 
changes in union formation, coupled with high divorce rates, have continued to 
characterize patterns of union formation and childbearing within cohabitation into the 
2000s (Perelli-Harris et al. 2012).  
Patterns of family formation also differ by institutional and policy context. The 
welfare state context shapes how states relate to individuals and families and may 
influence decisions about family formation (Esping-Andersen 1990). For example, 
welfare regimes that provide support to individuals may foster independent living and 
cohabitation, while those that rely on support from families may promote traditional 
marriage systems and late home leaving. In addition, states regulate tax and transfer 
systems: whether these systems are organized around married couples or individuals 
could influence couples’ decisions to marry or remain within cohabitation (Perelli-
Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012). In general, marriage and cohabitation policy and law 
can privilege marriage, thereby encouraging couples to marry, or harmonize 
cohabitation and marriage, possibly resulting in higher levels of cohabitation (Perelli-
Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012).  
Note that most of our discussion has focused on differences across Europe, paying 
little attention to the United States, which is also included in our analysis. Some have 
argued that the United States has a unique family formation pattern, due to the 
relatively high levels of divorce, re-partnering, and short-term cohabiting relationships, 
not to mention teenage pregnancy and childbearing to single-mothers (Cherlin 2009). 
Cherlin (2009) argues that the US “marriage-go-round” is the result of an emphasis on 
individualism bolstered by religious and legal institutions that support personal growth 
and renewal at the expense of lasting relationships. While Cherlin acknowledges socio-
economic and ethnic differentials and, indeed, the heterogeneity of union formation 
across American society, it is still unclear to what extent the US patterns of 
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heterogeneity match those in other countries. Given the high levels of divorce and re-
partnering in parts of Eastern Europe, the US may not be an outlier and may instead be 
more similar to other countries than expected (although we will not specifically look at 
race and ethnic differentials, which may still set the US apart). 
To reiterate, most of the demographic literature has focused on differences 
between countries in aggregate statistics, rather than comparing differences of 
composition within countries. By comparing patterns of heterogeneity across countries 
we can see which patterns are unique to particular countries and which are prevalent in 
all. We expect that all countries will have some proportion of the population 
represented in each partnership pattern, but the distribution of patterns will vary 
considerably. In addition, what is a predominant pattern in one country may turn out to 
be a significant minority in another country, even though that pattern may not be 
considered typical. Taken as whole, this analysis of the heterogeneity of relationship 
patterns in different countries can provide insights into how new behaviors emerge and 




We analyze retrospective union and fertility histories from 15 surveys that have been 
standardized in a dataset called the Harmonized Histories (Perelli-Harris, Kreyenfeld, 
and Kubisch 2010, and see www.nonmarital.org). Most of the data come from the 
Generations and Gender Surveys, which interviewed nationally representative samples 
of the resident population in each country. The countries which had GGSs were (date of 
survey in parentheses): Austria (2008–09), Belgium (2008–10), Bulgaria (2004), 
Estonia (2004–5), France (2005), Lithuania (2006), Italy (2003), Norway (2007–8), 
Romania (2005), and Russia (2004). Because the GGS is not available for all countries 
(or the retrospective histories were not adequate for our purposes), we also relied on 
other data sources. The Dutch data come from the 2003 Fertility and Family Survey 
(FFS). The UK data are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which based 
the analysis on interviews in 2005–06 but included information from previous surveys. 
The Spanish data come from the Survey of Fertility and Values conducted in 2006, and 
the Polish data are from the Employment, Family, and Education survey conducted in 
2006. The US data are from two rounds of the National Survey of Family Growth, 
conducted in 1995 and between 2006 and 2008. The surveys that comprise the 
Harmonized Histories have been frequently used in other studies and are generally 
considered high quality. In particular, fertility and marriage trends from most of the 
Generations and Gender Surveys reflect trends found in vital registration statistics (e.g., 
Vergauwen et al. 2015). 
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Despite slightly different survey designs, the union histories are relatively 
comparable. Because not all surveys include complete male union histories, we restrict 
the analyses to women. Our data include the month of entrance into cohabiting and 
marital unions as well as separation and divorce. Questions about cohabitation generally 
refer to co-resident relationships with an intimate partner that last more than three 
months. In the Italian and Austrian surveys, however, there is no minimum duration. 
Registered unions, or PACS, are recorded in the French GGS, but we include them with 
marriages because they are officially registered.3 
Our analysis examines the relationship states that occur between the ages of 15 and 
45, the ages at which women can become mothers. The age range interviewed in most 
of our surveys allows us to compare women born in 1945–54, 1955–64, and 1965–74. 
With these cohorts we can examine a wide age range but still capture recent changes in 
the younger cohorts. In Austria and Poland only women up to age 49 were interviewed: 
thus we only include one or two cohorts from each survey. In the US the earliest 
cohorts we can observe in the 1995 NSFG were born in 1950–54. Therefore, we use the 
1995 NSFG for the 1950-54 cohorts and 1955-64 cohorts. We use the NSFG 2006–08 
survey for the 1965-74 cohorts; we do not merge the two NSFG surveys due to different 
interviewing designs and sampling strategies, and because the sample size was 
sufficiently large. Table 1 shows the number of women aged 15–45 in each survey by 
cohort for the analysis sample. 
Because we are interested in analyzing union patterns across countries and over 
time, we pool the datasets to create a standard set of latent class growth curves for all 
countries. The large size of the pooled dataset allows a greater number of classes to 
emerge than for any individual country alone, thereby facilitating a more precise 
analysis of heterogeneity within countries. Note that while the Harmonized Histories 
surveys are relatively comparable, each survey’s sampling strategy differs, which can 
have different implications for the creation of the latent classes. Some surveys have no 
weights (for example, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania), while some surveys include 
sample weights at the individual level (Austria, France) or at both the household and 
individual level (UK). Thus, we first applied each country’s weighting scheme to ensure 
national representation. In addition, some surveys (i.e., Italy) have very large samples, 
which may dominate the pooled sample. To create a sample with each survey equally 
represented we have rescaled the population totals so that each survey contributes the 
same proportion to the total sample. This approach allows the internal validity of the 
surveys to be maintained, but ensures that no one survey dominates the sample. 
 
                                                          
3 Fewer than 1% of first marriages in France are PACS.  
Demographic Research: Volume 33, Article 6 
154 http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table 1: Number of women analyzed in each country by cohort before 
weighting 
Country 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 
Austria GGS  166 1,130 
Belgium GGS 450 566 479 
Bulgaria GGS 770 1141 1514 
Estonia GGS 851 879 801 
France GGS 794 730 783 
Italy GGS 6642 7056 5750 
Lithuania GGS  575 756 680 
Netherlands FFS 945 1084 993 
Norway GGS 1205 1290 1487 
Poland EFE   1,386 
Romania GGS 1167 933 1103 
Russia GGS 1153 1367 1025 
Spain SFS 1051 1378 1413 
UK BHPS 814 922 958 
US NSFG 1,635a 3,935a 1,913b 
 
Note: a) data are from 1995 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1950–54 and 1955–64 cohorts; b) data are from 
2006–08 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1965–74 cohorts. 
Sources: Generations and Gender Surveys in Austria (2008–09), Belgium (2008–10), Bulgaria (2004), Estonia (2004–5), France 
(2005), Lithuania (2006), Italy (2003), Norway (2007–8), Romania (2005), and Russia (2004); Fertility and Family Survey in the 
Netherlands (2003); British Household Panel Survey for the United Kingdom (2005–6); Poland Employment, Family, and 




In this paper we use latent class growth models (LCGMs) to determine classes of 
relationship patterns. LCGMs are commonly used in psychology (Perlman et al. 2015), 
behavioral studies (Pickles and Croudace 2010; Hix-Small et al. 2004; Schaeffer et al. 
2003), criminology (Muthén 2004), and education (van Lier et al. 2004), with recent 
applications in demography (Dariotis et al. 2011; Cheadle, Amato, and King 2010) and 
life course research (Virtanen et al. 2011). Latent class growth models are an extension 
of conventional growth curve models and assume that individuals are drawn from 
subpopulations (latent classes) that have different growth trajectories. In our study, 
individuals’ relationship histories are traced and then clustered into latent classes that 
represent different patterns of union formation. To our knowledge, our study is the first 
time LCGMs have been applied to cross-national survey data to compare latent classes 
of union formation within and across countries. 
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To create the Latent Class growth curves, we first expand the data into person-
years. 4  We then fit separate trajectories for each union status: never in a union, 
cohabiting, directly married, married having previously cohabited, and single after 
being in a previous union. 5  We distinguish between direct marriage and marriage 
preceded by cohabitation to show how entrance into marriage changes over time. This 
approach reveals to what extent cohabitation is emerging as a precursor to marriage or 
as a long-term relationship that lasts until the respondent is 45. 
To reiterate, the response variable for the model is defined as the random variable 
𝑦𝑖 . This variable is defined at every year of the respondent’s partnership history. 
 






0 𝑁𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛1 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔234 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
 
Respondents switch between these different states as they move along the life 
course from ages 15–45. If two of these partnerships are present within the same year, 
then the higher value state is selected (for example, if cohabitation transitions to 
marriage in the same year, the year is classified as 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 2 rather than 1). In certain 
circumstances the selection of higher states will lead to the truncation of some 
relationships; for instance, if a relationship occurs during the same year as a separation. 
In order to avoid missing relationships because they are overwritten by the ‘single after 
separation’ state, we replace years classified as separation with the new relationship 
status, although again these relationships may be truncated. As a result, short periods of 
separation could be missed. However, because few respondents have this type of 
relationship pattern, the underestimation does not substantially bias our results.  
We recognize that this specification of partnership does not include explicit states 
for higher order partnerships. We tried to estimate models including states for second or 
higher order marriages and cohabitation. However, this led to structural problems 
within the model since the rarity of these states meant that it was difficult to detect 
higher order classes. Since our model allows re-entry into union following separation, 
we believe this specification can adequately capture re-partnering when it occurs.  
                                                          
4 Although person-months would more accurately reflect changes in union status, computational limitations 
require the use of yearly intervals. However, yearly intervals are commonly used in studies using LCGM 
(e.g., Goldberg 2013). In addition, we ran models using monthly data for one country (France) and found no 
substantial differences in the number or type of classes.  
5 Women are considered single at time of separation, not divorce. We also include women whose previous 
partnerships ended in death of spouse, but there are relatively few cases. 
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We then use the statistical software Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 1998−2011) to 
calculate growth equations that describe different trajectories. Trajectories are 
combined to form each latent class, which describe different partnership patterns across 
the life course. Each woman has a probability of being in each latent class; the more 
closely her observed partnership history is to the class trajectories, the higher the 
probability of class membership. The probability of being in partnership 𝑠 at a given 
age is defined as  𝜋𝑖,𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 = Pr (𝑦𝑖,𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑠)  (see Equation 1). i indexes the individual 
woman. The probability of partnerships across the life course is modeled as a growth 
equation, where 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑎𝑔𝑒 is a function of 𝑎𝑔𝑒 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒2 5F6. A separate growth equation is 
specified for each class 𝐶𝑗, where j indexes the class and there are 1…J classes. For 
logit estimation, we set direct marriage, the most prevalent state, as the reference 
category (i.e., this logit is omitted to identify the model). 
 ln��𝜋𝑖,𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 �𝐶𝑗 = 𝑗�
�𝜋𝑖,𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠=3 �𝐶𝑗 = 𝑗�� = 𝛼𝑗𝑠 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2,𝑗𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖2, 𝑗 = {1 … . 𝐽}, 𝑠 = {0 … 4} (1) 
 
In Equation 1, the class-specific intercept is described by 𝛼𝑗𝑠 , while the class-
specific growth curve is described by 𝛽1,𝑗𝑠  and 𝛽2,𝑗𝑠 . All three of these parameters vary 
depending on membership in a particular class. In Equation 1 the trajectories differ only 
according to class membership, 𝐶𝑗.
7 
Latent Class Growth Curve models provide objective measure of the number of 
classes that optimally fit the data. Thus, we can use an inductive approach to allow the 
optimal number of classes to emerge from the data rather than determining the number 
of classes a priori, which may not accurately reflect the actual data.8 We rely on the Lo-
Mendell-Rubin Likelihood Ratio Test (LMR-LRT) (Lo, Mendell, and Rubin 2001) to 
determine the number of classes, mirroring the recommendation of Nylund, 
Asparouhov, and Muthén (2007) and applied by Virtanen et al. (2011). The LMR-LRT 
                                                          
6 We tested the specification of the shape of the age profile to include the possibility of linearity on the logit 
scale, as well as extending the selected model to include a cubic term. Both of these models provided worse 
model fit than the quadratic model selected based on AIC, BIC, and Sample-Size adjusted BIC. We note also 
that we can, where necessary, include different shapes for profiles in different classes – a distinct advantage 
over sequence analysis, which requires a universal distance measure to construct clusters.  
7 Growth Mixture Models, an extension of Eq. 1, describe individual deviation from the overall growth curve 
within class j via random coefficients, and can extract fewer classes and estimate more parsimonious models. 
However, it was extremely difficult to obtain convergent solutions for models with random coefficients, since 
in some classes the probability of certain states was approximated at zero (and hence the variance estimate 
was difficult to obtain). Therefore the models must be restricted to LCGM only, which assumes that variation 
in partnership trajectories is a function of class membership only.  
8 Elzinga and Liefbroer (2007) imply that one of the disadvantages of sequence analysis is that it is difficult to 
decide on the number of clusters or classes using an inductive approach. LCGM seeks to use an inductive 
approach to determine the number of classes using model fit statistics. 
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is similar to conventional Likelihood Ratio tests that interpret p-values below a certain 
threshold as indicative of an improvement in model fit, where the p-value is adjusted to 
reflect the fact that the Likelihood does not follow a Chi-Square distribution.9 As noted, 
other tests of model fit (such as the shape of the partnership growth curves) were 
determined by comparing AIC, BIC, and SS-BIC values, and choosing the model with 
the best fit (i.e., the lowest fit statistic).  
To examine heterogeneity within and across countries, we present two types of 
results. First, we show class trajectories, which are based on the equations generated for 
each class. Each trajectory is used to produce a probability of union status from age 15–
45. Second, we estimate the posterior probability of class membership by cohort and 
country. The probability of class membership is the probability that a particular 
respondent is a member of class j given their partnership history, which is assumed to 
be non-zero for all j. If the observed history closely matches the class trajectory the 
posterior probability of class membership will be high; conversely, if the history 
deviates substantially, the probability of class membership will be low. The posterior 
probabilities for each respondent sum to 1 across all classes for each individual. We 
present the mean posterior probability of class membership by country and cohort.  
The classes reflect the entire pooled dataset, but they may not be completely 
representative of current behavior in Europe and the United States, because of the 
composition of the sample. In addition, a large proportion of trajectories in the youngest 
cohort are right truncated by the date of survey. To ensure that our results reflect trends 
within the data, rather than an artifact of our sample selection, we conducted three 
robustness checks. First, because more women are from older cohorts, the results could 
be driven by women with traditional marriage patterns, thus preventing the observation 
of new patterns more common in the younger cohorts (for example cohabitation classes 
similar to the marriage classes). To check for this, we re-estimated the models for each 
cohort separately. Comparison of the predicted curves revealed that all curves for each 
cohort were captured by the pooled model (i.e., each of the extracted models produced 
classes which were similar when comparing predicted probabilities for each age). We 
did not find any additional classes in any of the cohorts. We were particularly 
concerned about recent changes in union formation in the 1965–74 cohort; however, 
only four classes were extracted, none of which had a substantially different profile to 
those extracted from the pooled model. In particular, we did not find an additional 
cohabitation class. 
The second robustness check is also related to the truncation issue among younger 
women. Because the youngest cohorts have not been exposed to the full age-range 
                                                          
9 Although the Bootstrap Likelihood Ratio test is a superior measure for testing the number of classes due to a 
lower false positive rate (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 2007), this test is considered too computationally 
intensive in this circumstance. 
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(depending on survey date), classes that represent behavior more likely to occur at older 
ages (i.e., 30–45) may only include older women. This means that younger women have 
a lower probability of falling into classes dominated by separation and re-partnering 
that occurs later in the life course. To assess the impact of this truncation we tested 
models by censoring partnership histories for all women at ages 40, 35, and 30. This 
procedure resulted in a smaller number of classes with a similar profile to those already 
extracted, with few classes incorporating separation behavior in any cohort. 
Nonetheless, despite the limitation of the underrepresentation of the younger cohorts, 
we prefer to retain the upper age limit of 45 for all cohorts to examine union transitions 
into mid-life, while also including younger cohorts who are experiencing new patterns 
of union formation.  
Finally, we were concerned that the sample specification did not allow classes to 
emerge that were present in particular countries. For example, Norway may have had a 
more distinct cohabitation class that is indistinguishable from marriage, and the other 
countries with more traditional patterns may have prevented this pattern from emerging. 
On the other hand, the countries with newer patterns may have prevented additional 
traditional patterns from emerging. To address this issue, we took two approaches. 
First, we removed two countries with very traditional patterns (Italy and Spain) and 
then two countries with newer patterns (Norway and the Netherlands) and reran the 
models. These alternative strategies also resulted in the same number of classes, none of 
which were substantially different from those in the original pooled dataset. Second, we 
examined each country separately. This resulted in far fewer classes (a maximum of 
six), none of which were substantially different from the original pooled model. This 
check indicates that the smaller datasets have less statistical power and result in less 
variation, which make the few classes extracted a crude description of partnership 
behavior. Therefore, we feel confident that the pooled dataset is not only representative 
of the examined cohorts and countries but also allows for greater heterogeneity to 
emerge in each of the countries and cohorts. 
 
 
5. Results  
5.1 Extracted classes 
As discussed above, we are interested in determining the optimal number of latent 
classes that reflect relationship patterns across Europe and for the United States. The 
LMR-LRT p-values indicate that the addition of an eighth class improves model fit at 
the 5% level (LMR p-value is 0.018). Since the LMR-LRT tends to be conservative 
(Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 2007) we accept 5% significance as sufficient 
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evidence of the existence of eight classes. The addition of a ninth class is not significant 
on the same criterion, so we select the eight-class model. The eight classes extracted 
from the model are shown in Figure 1. (See also Appendix 1a and 1b for an alternative 
presentation of results.) Note that the area under the curve represents the probability of 
being in a particular relationship state at a given age. Thus, the peak of each growth 
curve shows the ages when that state is most likely for individuals in each class. 
The eight classes that emerge differ across each of the dimensions discussed in the 
theoretical framework. First, the classes represent different types of union. Classes 1 
and 2 are dominated by direct marriage. Classes 3 and 4 show some cohabitation and 
primarily stable marriage preceded by cohabitation. Class 5 shows late union formation, 
dominated by cohabitation; class 8 is also characterized by cohabitation followed by 
some marriage in the early 40s. Second, the classes show how age contributes to the 
distinction between different patterns of union formation. Class 2 shows the 
postponement of direct marriage compared to class 1, while class 4 shows the 
postponement of marriage preceded by cohabitation compared to class 3. Class 5 stands 
out with its late pattern of union formation. Finally, we can see union dissolution and 
re-partnering predominantly in classes 6 and 7.  
Note that because the latent class growth curve models optimize both the type of 
union and the age at which different transitions occur, the classes are not perfectly 
aligned along any dimension. Nearly every class includes a small probability of 
experiencing other behaviors, or the behaviors are not precisely timed at a given period 
but instead occur across the life course. For example, class 2 has a tiny probability of 
experiencing separation in the early 40s. These small deviations are necessary, because 
the range and timing of behaviors is quite complex for the thousands of respondents in 
the dataset. Nonetheless, the classes capture a large range of significant patterns. We 
now turn to a detailed description of each class. 
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Figure 1: Latent classes based on models of growth trajectories 
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Classes 1 & 2: Direct marriage, stable throughout. Class 1 shows a very early 
marriage pattern, with the bulk of direct marriages predicted to occur before age 20, and 
all marriages predicted to occur before age 23. The marriages are essentially stable with 
a tiny upturn in divorce to about 4% at age 44. Class 2 shows a similar pattern, only 
postponed by about 5 years. Nearly all marriages occur before age 30, with a 
probability of 99% of the class being married in their 30s. Only a tiny percentage is 
likely to end in divorce. 
Classes 3 & 4: Premarital cohabitation followed by relatively stable marriage. 
Classes 3 and 4 represent marriage that was preceded by cohabitation, but class 3 shows 
an earlier pattern of union formation than class 4. For class 3, nearly all women are 
predicted to enter into a union by age 27. About a third of the class is likely to 
experience cohabitation at age 19, with a high probability of transitioning to marriage 
shortly thereafter. By age 30 the predicted probability of marriage is 97%. Note that 
there is more than a 20% chance that women in class 3 are likely to experience divorce 
by age 44, which is much higher than in the early marriage class (class 1). This suggests 
that women who premaritally cohabited at an early age have higher divorce rates than 
women who directly married, as has been found in previous studies (Liefbroer and 
Dourleijn 2006). The separation line does not climb above 0 until the late 30s, when all 
women would have already married. Thus, in this class, cohabitation only precedes 
marriage and does not therefore capture behaviors of dissolving cohabiting relationships 
with marital re-partnering. Class 4 has a later pattern of marriage preceded by 
cohabitation, but in this class the probability of women premaritally cohabiting at age 
25 is nearly 50%. The probability of marriage is over 90% among women in their 
thirties. Fewer women are predicted to have divorced by age 44, probably because they 
had been married for a shorter period of time or because women who marry later have 
lower divorce risks than those who marry earlier. Note that class 4 also includes a small 
bump of women who directly married, separated, and then entered cohabitation 
followed by marriage, suggesting that early divorces are likely to be followed by 
cohabitation rather than direct marriage.   
Class 5: Late union/never partnering. Class 5 captures late and varied partnership 
behavior. The never-partnered state extends into the early 30s, with the probability of 
never being partnered above 95% until after age 27. Marriage preceded by cohabitation 
starts to increase in the early 30s, with about one third of respondents predicted to be in 
this type of marriage in their early 40s. Some direct marriages occur in the early 30s, 
but the probability of directly marrying levels off at around 30% after age 35. Some of 
the unions also separate, with a steady increase in singles in the mid-30s, but it is 
difficult to know if those who separate are likely to re-enter a partnership. Although 
there is a bump in cohabitation between the ages of 25 and 35, this never exceeds 5%. 
Class 5 also captures those who do not form partnerships before age 44; this class is the 
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only one with a probability of never marrying in the 30s greater than 1%. At age 44, 
nearly 25% are still unpartnered, with a small upturn that captures anyone remaining 
unpartnered in the dataset.  
Classes 6 and 7: Divorce and Separation. Classes 6 and 7 represent relationship 
patterns with substantial divorce and separation. In class 6, direct marriage starts early, 
with a steep increase in the teenage years. The probability of direct marriage then peaks 
around age 25 at nearly 90%. Starting in the late 20s, divorce starts to increase; we can 
assume these are divorces from marriage, because they are preceded by marriage, not 
cohabitation. By the late 40s, over 65% of women are predicted to still be single after 
separation. Some enter a second (or possibly third or higher) cohabitation or marriage 
preceded by cohabitation. It is unlikely that women re-enter direct marriage in this 
class, because the direct marriage trajectory declines so dramatically after age 25. Class 
7 has substantial premarital cohabitation and marriage followed by divorce. 
Cohabitation peaks at age 22 followed by a similar bump in ‘marriage preceded by 
cohabitation’, shifted to the right. Direct marriage is also at a low level in this class: it 
appears that those who separate could directly remarry, because the probability of direct 
marriage climbs above 20% after age 40. Nonetheless, direct remarriage is at a very low 
level except in the early 40s. Overall, however, the majority of women allocated to this 
class have a higher probability of remaining single after separation, into their 30s and 
40s.  
Class 8: Cohabitation. Because of its predominant cohabitation trajectory, class 8 
could be considered the class in which cohabitation is closest to ‘indistinguishable from 
marriage’. Nonetheless, this class is not completely similar to any of the marriage 
classes (i.e., classes 1–4). Unlike the marriage trajectories in classes 1–4, the 
cohabitation trajectory in class 8 does not reach 90% and remains relatively stable. 
Instead, the cohabitation trajectory peaks around age 29 and begins to decline 
substantially after the mid-30s, with a low level of separation and a steady increase in 
marriage preceded by cohabitation. The ‘marriage preceded by cohabitation’ trajectory 
peaks to about a quarter after age 40, suggesting that cohabitation is not a long-term 
state. This class also includes a small bump in ‘direct marriage’ and a low level of 
separation, representing women who directly marry, divorce, and then enter 
cohabitation. Thus, while long-term cohabitation does have its own class, the class is 
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5.2 Posterior class distributions 
We now turn to a comparison of the heterogeneity of relationship patterns within and 
across countries. Figure 2 presents the average predicted probability for women to fall 
into each class by country for the birth cohorts a) 1945–54, b) 1955–64, and c) 1965–74 
(see also Appendices 1a and 1b for tables showing the Mean posterior distribution of 
class membership by country and cohort). As expected, the three cohort figures reflect 
the differences in marriage timing and the uptake of premarital cohabitation across 
Europe and the U.S. In each figure the countries are ordered according to class 1, the 
early direct marriage class. In general, all three figures are dominated by the first four 
marriage classes, which primarily represent marriage that remains stable into the 
women’s late 30s and early 40s. The third and fourth classes include some premarital 
cohabitation, but this type of cohabitation quickly changes into marriage, which 
generally lasts into the mid-40s. Relatively few women fall into class 5, the late 
partnership formation class, indicating that co-residential partnerships are not being 
abandoned altogether, nor even postponed much into the 30s. Nonetheless, this class is 
smaller in the earlier cohorts and does become larger over time, especially in Belgium 
and the Southern European countries. 
Thus, even though we have ordered the classes by the ‘early’ stable marriage 
category in Figure 2, we reiterate that the classes not only reflect age but also type of 
union and separation. In all cohorts, the countries with later and more heterogeneous 
union formation patterns are generally at the top of Figure 2; for example, those in 
Northern Europe. Some early marriage countries, for example Russia, may not be as 
near to the bottom as expected, because some respondents who marry early end up in 
the divorce class (class 6). 
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Figure 2: Mean posterior probability of class membership by country for a) 
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Notes: * This Austrian cohort only includes women born 1960–64, because only women up to 49 were interviewed in 2008/9. 
**We only include the 1965–74 cohorts in Poland, because only women up to age 40 were interviewed in 2006. 
† The 1995 NSFG was used for the 1950–54 and 1955–64 cohorts.  
† † The 2006-08 NSFG was used for the 1965–74 cohorts. 
 
We now turn to a separate description of each cohort figure. Figure (a) shows the 
1945–54 cohort, which is the ‘baby boomer’ cohort in many countries. This cohort 
formed unions during the ‘Golden Age of Marriage’, when marriage was at its peak. 
Figure (a) indicates that over 50% of respondents in all countries remained in stable 
direct marriages until their mid-40s. However, we can already see some interesting 
divergence from this stable marriage pattern. Premarital cohabitation is at a low level in 
most countries, as is divorce and repartnering. Estonia, Norway, the US, and Russia 
have over 40% of women falling into classes not dominated by direct marriage, 
although in Estonia, Norway, and Russia most of those who do not directly marry 
premaritally cohabit (classes 3 and 4) or form unions later in life (class 5). The US has a 
relatively large percentage of women falling into the divorce and separation classes 
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(class 6 and class 7). This is not surprising, since the US had early reforms in divorce 
law and an earlier upsurge in divorce than in many countries. However, Lithuania, 
Russia, and Estonia also had large bands for class 6, reflecting high divorce rates in 
these countries. Some countries had practically no divorce in this cohort, for example 
Spain and Italy, which are dominated by direct marriage.  
The 1955–64 cohorts started to show a greater percentage of countries 
experiencing premarital cohabitation and other patterns of union formation behavior. 
Less than 25% of women in Austria and Norway directly married, while less than half 
directly married in Western Europe, Estonia, and the US. Southern and Eastern Europe 
continued to have a greater share directly marrying. The widening of the class 3 and 
class 4 bars indicate that most of Western and Northern Europe and the US experienced 
an increase in premarital cohabitation: an increase very limited in Southern Europe and 
most of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Bulgaria, which had substantial early 
premarital cohabitation. However, the class 8 bar, which represents the cohabitation 
class, has only limited increases, indicating that long-term cohabitation (even if 
followed by marriage) was still relatively rare. Lithuania, Russia, and to some extent 
Estonia stand out with the largest class 6 bars, indicating a high proportion that divorce 
with some entrance into a new cohabiting union or marriage preceded by cohabitation. 
Interestingly, the US had very little change between the two cohorts; the divorce class 
(class 6) declined slightly, with a slight increase in the class 7 bar, suggesting that some 
people who married and divorced cohabited and possibly married and then dissolved 
their relationships. The US’s large class 7 bar corroborates studies which show a high 
level of “relationship churning” (Cherlin 2009), but it no longer seems the outlier when 
compared to much of Eastern Europe. 
The change between the 1955–64 cohort and 1965–74 cohort is remarkable. In the 
latter only the Eastern European countries have more than 25% of respondents in the 
early marriage class (class 1). Italy, Spain, and to some degree Poland show a large 
increase in class 2, which indicates that the greatest changes in relationship formation in 
these countries have been due to the timing of marriage, not new union forms or union 
dissolution. In fact, divorce class 6 and separation class 7 are still miniscule in Italy and 
Spain. The Northern and Western European countries and the US, on the other hand, 
have experienced a substantial increase in marriage that is preceded by cohabitation, 
particularly in class 4, suggesting that women are spending longer periods in premarital 
cohabitation and postponing marriage.  
Many Northern and Western European countries have also experienced a 
substantial increase in class 8, from under 10% to over 20% in some Western European 
countries. This increase implies that long-term cohabitation is becoming more popular, 
but nonetheless it often transitions to marriage or ends in separation in the late 30s and 
early 40s. However, it is possible that figure (c) may not represent the experiences of 
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the 1970–74 cohorts, because their cohabiting unions may be more stable and less likely 
to convert to marriage in their late 30s and early 40s, which is not completely captured 
in class 8. The experience of the youngest cohorts could flatten the shape of the 
cohabitation trajectory in class 8; however, we will not know for sure until full 
relationship data becomes available.  
Lithuania, Russia, Bulgaria, and the US have not seen as much of an increase in 
long-term cohabitation (class 8), but instead have seen a substantial increase in divorce 
and separation. This indicates that a substantial proportion of relationships in these 
countries remain fragile. In most countries, however, the divorce class (class 6) has 
shrunk over time. In the Northern and Western European classes the decline in divorce 
has been accompanied by an increase in class 7, suggesting that relationships which are 
more likely to break down no longer start off with early direct marriage, but instead 
start with early cohabitation sometimes followed by marriage. It is possible that the 
decline in class 6 is because the youngest cohorts (1970–74) are not exposed to risk 
long enough for them to experience divorce. However, since class 6 is dominated by 
direct marriage, it is unlikely that many young women in Northern and Western Europe 
would end up in class 6 rather than the direct marriage classes (1 or 2), especially 
because the bars for these classes are relatively small. Instead, it is more likely that 
women transfer from classes 3 or 8 into class 7. On the other hand, in the Eastern 
European countries, which still have a large proportion of the population falling into the 




Numerous studies on European countries and the US show that marriage has been 
postponed, cohabitation has increased, and unions are more likely to dissolve (Sobotka 
and Toulemon 2008; Kennedy and Bumpass 2008; Billari and Liefbroer 2010). 
However, no study has been able to capture all of these dimensions simultaneously to 
show which changes have contributed the most to new patterns of union formation. 
Here we illustrate the variety of relationship patterns in Europe and the United States 
and show how the distribution of these patterns has shifted over time. The value of this 
approach is that it shows the relative importance of different types of transition for 
changing union patterns. Rather than looking only at one event – or the timing of one 
event – we can see which event matters most to changes in overall partnership patterns. 
These findings lead us to several conclusions.  
First, the figures show that most of the change in union formation has occurred due 
to the postponement of stable marriages rather than the increase in long-term 
cohabitation and divorce. In all countries we can see a decline in the early marriage 
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classes and an increase in the later marriage classes. The vast majority of marriages 
were stable throughout the respondents’ 30s and early 40s, when women would have 
been having children. For example, in the 1965–74 cohort more than 50% of 
respondents were in stable marriage classes (1, 2, 3, or 4), and in most countries this 
percentage was closer to 60 or 70. These results suggest that in most countries, marriage 
has been changing primarily due to the increase in premarital cohabitation, a 
development which should have fewer negative implications than if marriage were 
changing more due to divorce. 
We can also see the role that cohabitation plays in shifting the age at marriage. 
Most studies analyzing cohabitation and marriage use competing risk hazard models to 
model choices between the two types of union (e.g., Hoem et al. 2009), rather than 
examining how cohabitation may shift the age at marriage. Our approach shows that 
across most countries premarital cohabitation delays the entrance into stable marriages, 
but has not become a long-term alternative. For example, the broadening of class 4 in 
Northern and Western Europe in Figure 2 shows how relationships often start with 
cohabitation that later transition to official marriage. Nonetheless, in countries such as 
Spain and Italy the primary change in relationship patterns has been due to changes in 
the timing of direct marriage without premarital cohabitation (a shift from class 1 to 2). 
We also see a small increase in class 5 in most of Western and Southern Europe, 
indicating postponing or not entering unions before age 45. Thus, across Europe and the 
US, changes in the timing of living with and marrying a partner have been one of the 
most crucial changes to partnership formation in the past decades. 
Second, the LCGMs did not produce a cohabitation class that looked identical to 
the marriage classes. Previous research based on life-table estimates has suggested that 
cohabitation in some countries looks like an “alternative to marriage” or 
“indistinguishable from marriage”, suggesting that cohabiting unions have become 
long-term, stable unions (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Kiernan 2004). Yet long-
term cohabitation without some entrance into marriage or separation did not emerge as 
a class by itself. Instead, we find that in the cohabitation class, women tend to marry or 
separate in their late 30s or 40s. This suggests that cohabitation is not a replacement for 
marriage, with consistent stability throughout the reproductive years. It is important to 
note, however, that union formation is changing rapidly, and long-term cohabitation 
may be increasing. Our models cannot take into account the behavior of women in the 
youngest cohort (1970–74) after age 30 or 35 (depending on the year of interview). It is 
possible that cohabiting women in these cohorts will not marry in their late 30s or early 
40s, which could possibly alter the cohabitation trajectory of class 8. If this happens, 
cohabitation could become more indistinguishable from marriage in the coming years. 
Third, our findings show how relationship patterns are changing due to shifts in 
separation and re-partnering. As in some other studies (e.g., Liefbroer and Dourleijn 
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2006), we find that cohabitation and marriages preceded by cohabitation are more likely 
to end in separation than direct marriages. The separation class dominated by premarital 
cohabitation (class 7) is becoming more prevalent than the divorce class dominated by 
direct marriage (class 6), although this is predominantly due to the decline in direct 
marriage. We did not find evidence of many women directly remarrying: class 6 shows 
that divorced women may enter into cohabitation which is sometimes followed by 
marriage, but the downward-sloping direct marriage line suggests that women are not 
directly remarrying. Class 7 does have some women directly remarrying, but it is in the 
context of higher levels of cohabitation and marriage preceded by cohabitation. As a 
whole, these results provide evidence that cohabitation is becoming more prevalent for 
second and higher unions.  
Several limitations of this research must be noted. First, as discussed above, 
respondents in the later cohorts of 1965–74 have not reached 45 by the time of the 
survey. This could possibly underestimate the probability of falling into the separation 
or divorce classes and overestimate the probability of falling into classes with less 
separation. Second, because we must specify the trajectories using yearly data, 
relationships may be truncated and periods of separation lasting less than a year may be 
missed; however, this applies to relatively few cases. Third, each survey is subject to 
errors and limitations that may bias results (see Perelli-Harris, Kreyenfeld, and Kubisch 
2010 for a description of each survey), although the surveys have been frequently used 
in other studies and generally found to accord with official statistics (Vergauwen et al. 
2015). Finally, these analyses do not include covariates that could help to explain 
whether the patterns may be stratified within countries, for example by education (see 
Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2014), or why partnership patterns are changing across 
countries. Future research using latent class growth curves could provide greater insight 
into the predictors of partnership patterns or associated outcomes.  
In general, this investigation has provided insight into the heterogeneity of 
relationship behavior within countries and shown the similarity of relationship patterns 
across countries. The findings reinforce the idea that summary measures do not 
necessarily capture the diversity of behaviors within a country and that countries may 
end up looking more like each other once heterogeneity is taken into account. The US is 
an ideal case for illustrating this. While the US appears to be an outlier when using 
certain summary statistics, such as the percentage of cohabiting unions that dissolve or 
the number of marriages that end in divorce (Cherlin 2009), we can see that the US 
does not stand out when observing relationship patterns by age and union type. 
Although we saw that the US was unusual in the 1950–54 cohort, especially due to the 
higher proportion of respondents who were in the divorce classes, the US did not stand 
out in the subsequent cohorts. In fact, the US does not appear to have disproportionately 
higher “relationship churning” in the later cohorts, especially when compared to the 
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Eastern European countries, which have rarely been included in previous comparisons. 
Russia, Lithuania, and Estonia have a greater proportion of the population falling into 
classes 6 and 7, indicating more relationship instability and turnover. Therefore, our 
analysis shows that patterns of union dissolution and repartnering in the US are more 
similar to Eastern than Western Europe. The underlying reasons for the partnership 
patterns may be similar: for example, these societies have been facing economic 
uncertainty that may strain relationships. Previous research has shown that childbearing 
within cohabitation in Russia and the US can be characterized by a “pattern of 
disadvantage” (Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010, McLanahan 
2004), which may be carrying through to partnership instability in general. On the other 
hand, the explanations for similar partnership patterns could be quite different, 
reflecting unique cultural responses to social change. In any case, further research needs 
to explore why these countries have such unstable partnership patterns. 
Finally, our analyses have provided insight into how relationship patterns are 
changing throughout the reproductive period. In most contemporary countries, marriage 
and cohabitation are intertwined with each other; cohabitation is increasingly preceding 
marriages that last throughout the reproductive period, and, less frequently, partnerships 
are followed by divorce. However, our findings show that changes in union formation 
across countries do not necessarily occur in the same way. In Northern and Western 
Europe the entrance into and exit from marriage has become much more unpredictable, 
with an increase in variety of union patterns, although most marriages are still stable 
throughout the reproductive years. In Southern Europe the emergence of cohabitation 
and divorce has not been as important as the postponement of marriage, indicating that 
the institution of marriage has remained strong. Nonetheless, the delay in direct 
marriage must be leading to differences in the way men and women conduct intimate 
relationships without living together, as well as the interaction with families who are 
increasingly supporting single people as the age at leaving home increases. In parts of 
Eastern Europe, on the other hand, marriage is more likely to begin without 
cohabitation but end with divorce, suggesting that marital relationships are more fragile. 
Finally, although the United States is often considered an outlier in terms of 
relationship churning, our findings show that Eastern Europe is quite similar, but 
without the steep increase in cohabitation. Thus, although unions are changing in all 
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Appendix 1a: Mean posterior distribution of class membership by 
country and cohort 
 
Class 1: Early and direct 
stable marriage 
Class 2: Later, direct and 
stable marriage 
Class 3: Early marriage, 
preceded by cohabitation 
Class 4: Postponed marriage, 
preceded by cohabitation 










Belgium 0.444 0.343 0.163 0.211 0.195 0.128 0.122 0.127 0.137 0.062 0.070 0.198 
Bulgaria 0.510 0.488 0.438 0.207 0.122 0.118 0.148 0.204 0.209 0.031 0.055 0.066 
Estonia 0.324 0.278 0.181 0.190 0.106 0.040 0.122 0.159 0.202 0.085 0.096 0.0927 
France 0.500 0.274 0.080 0.169 0.094 0.066 0.045 0.148 0.186 0.0519 0.147 0.243 
Lithuania 0.411 0.353 0.400 0.313 0.257 0.198 0.022 0.042 0.054 0.013 0.025 0.036 
Italy 0.527 0.449 0.267 0.401 0.408 0.503 0.007 0.018 0.033 0.010 0.028 0.052 
NL 0.498 0.331 0.111 0.228 0.132 0.101 0.045 0.148 0.148 0.074 0.178 0.307 










Romania 0.588 0.528 0.544 0.211 0.222 0.169 0.054 0.073 0.097 0.0289 0.031 0.039 
Russia 0.399 0.401 0.377 0.166 0.149 0.079 0.077 0.073 0.097 0.057 0.047 0.052 
Spain 0.426 0.414 0.217 0.432 0.366 0.419 0.034 0.034 0.044 0.028 0.043 0.072 
UK 0.482 0.273 0.087 0.183 0.129 0.105 0.035 0.082 0.105 0.059 0.130 0.222 
USAa,b 0.349 0.273 0.131 0.137 0.157 0.159 0.055 0.093. 0.093 0.089 0.107 0.157 
 
 
Appendix 1b: Mean posterior distribution of class membership by 
country and cohort 
 
Class 5: Late union 
formation/Never partnering 
Class 6: Divorce, limited re-
partnering 
Class 7: Varied dissolving 
union types 
Class 8: Cohabitation 










Belgium 0.095 0.138 0.140 0.023 0.011 0.008 0.020 0.072 0.095 0.0186 0.041 0.126 
Bulgaria 0.035 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.053 0.048 0.010 0.027 0.033 0.0106 0.021 0.060 
Estonia 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.144 0.140 0.071 0.063 0.097 0.122 0.035 0.084 0.249 
France 0.087 0.106 0.093 0.085 0.073 0.015 0.029 0.056 0.074 0.034 0.104 0.238 
Lithuania 0.052 0.056 0.098 0.139 0.219 0.179 0.031 0.036 0.069 0.014 0.009 0.031 
Italy 0.038 0.070 0.095 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.018 0.007 0.008 0.024 
NL 0.024 0.045 0.056 0.077 0.050 0.021 0.034 0.056 0.060 0.017 0.056 0.191 










Romania 0.018 0.019 0.029 0.069 0.076 0.050 0.009 0.024 0.029 0.020 0.023 0.038 
Russia 0.053 0.042 0.030 0.142 0.177 0.133 0.072 0.067 0.129 0.031 0.043 0.089 
Spain 0.042 0.062 0.117 0.027 0.048 0.041 0.003 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.019 0.068 
UK 0.076 0.129 0.137 0.132 0.150 0.065 0.024 0.065 0.111 0.006 0.037 0.164 
USAa,b 0.047 0.043 0.079 0.168 0.115 0.100 0.114 0.154 0.189 0.035 0.054 0.087 
 
Note: a) data are from 1995 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1950–54 and 1955–64 cohorts; b) data are from 
2006–08 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1965–74 cohorts. 
Sources: Generations and Gender Surveys in Austria (2008–09), Belgium (2008–10), Bulgaria (2004), Estonia (2004–5), France 
(2005), Lithuania (2006), Italy (2003), Norway (2007–8), Romania (2005), and Russia (2004); Fertility and Family Survey in the 
Netherlands (2003); British Household Panel Survey for the United Kingdom (2005–6); Poland Employment, Family, and 
Education Survey (2006); Spanish Fertility Survey (2006); US National Survey of Family Growth (1995, 2006–8). 
